> Verdict out: McLaren loses all constructors' points - drivers safe. UPDATED

The FIA has published a 14-page summary of the new evidence that led to Thursday’s decision by the World Motor Sport Council to impose a draconian penalty on McLaren over the espionage affair.

As predicted, the evidence centres on email exchanges between McLaren test driver Pedro de la Rosa and world champion Fernando Alonso, as well as traces of phone calls and text messages between the team’s then chief designer Mike Coughlan and Ferrari’s Nigel Stepney.

The emails between de la Rosa and Alonso appear to contradict a core element of McLaren’s defence – that confidential Ferrari information was not circulated within the team but was held by a single ‘rogue’ employee for his own purposes.

The WMSC concludes: "The emails show unequivocally that both Mr Alonso and Mr de la Rosa received confidential Ferrari information via Coughlan; that both drivers knew that this information was confidential Ferrari information and that both knew that the information was being received by Coughlan from Stepney."

In emails sent in late March and early April, extracts of which are published in the FIA’s report, de la Rosa and Alonso discussed information gleaned from Stepney about the design and performance of Ferrari’s F2007 car.

On 21 March, de la Rosa emailed Coughlan asking for information about the Ferrari’s weight distribution, saying “it would be important for us to know so that we could try it in the simulator” and adding that “I will be in the simulator tomorrow”.

After receiving a reply by text message, he then emailed Alonso four days later setting out Ferrari’s weight distribution to two decimal places on each of the Maranello team’s cars as set up for the Australian Grand Prix.

When Alonso questioned the reliability of the data, de la Rosa replied: “All the information from Ferrari is very reliable.

“It comes from Nigel Stepney, their former chief mechanic – I don’t know what place he holds now.

“He’s the same person who told us in Australia that Kimi [Raikkonen] was stopping in lap 18.

“He’s very friendly with Mike Coughlan, our chief designer, and he told him that.”

De la Rosa told the WMSC that the Ferrari settings were never tried because the weight distribution was so different to that on the McLaren, and that “thereafter he regarded the information as unimportant”.

The Council was not convinced the information went no further, however, arguing that “it seems highly unlikely…that a test driver would take a decision of this sort on his own” and questioning why, if that was the case, de la Rosa proceeded to discuss it with Alonso.

It also notes that de la Rosa had shown no compunction about using a rival team’s information.

“Mr de la Rosa’s evidence also makes clear that there was no reluctance or hesitation about testing the Ferrari information for potential benefit, but only that on this occasion he says that there was a technical reason not to do so,” it says.

In the emails to Alonso, de la Rosa also discussed a flexible rear wing which he said was “a copy of the system we think Ferrari uses”, specified the Ferrari’s precise aero balance at 250 kph and referred to a gas the Italian team used to inflate its tyres so as to reduce blistering.

Alonso replied that it was “very important” that McLaren test the gas that Ferrari was using in its tyres as “they have something different from the rest”, and “not only this year…there is something else and this may be the key; let’s hope we can test it during the test, and that we can make it a priority!”

The report then documents a further email from de la Rosa to Coughlan asking for information about Ferrari’s braking system.

Coughlan obliged with a detailed technical description of the system and added that “we are looking at something similar”.

The WMSC concludes: “This latter statement strongly suggests that the McLaren system was being worked on from a position of knowledge of the details of the Ferrari system, which, even if the Ferrari system [was] not being directly copied, must be more advantageous to McLaren than designing a system without such knowledge.”

The report also says the Council was presented with evidence that Stepney had fed information through Coughlan about Ferrari’s intended pit strategy in the Australian and Bahrain Grands Prix.

The WMSC goes on to adduce evidence provided by the Italian police which shows that there was much more extensive contact between Coughlan and Stepney than had originally been appreciated.

“New evidence has come to light which strongly indicates that the transmission of the confidential Ferrari information from Stepney to Coughlan was not limited to the 780-page dossier,” it states.

“This evidence demonstrates that a far greater level of communication existed between Coughlan and Stepney than was appreciated at the 26 July WMSC meeting.

“This evidence was submitted by Ferrari and is deemed credible as it originates from the Italian police and is the result of an official analysis of records of telephone, SMS and email contacts between Coughlan and Stepney.”

Moreover, the WMSC says the contact intensified around tests and grand prix weekends, which – in light of the emails between de la Rosa, Alonso and Coughlan – suggested a competitive advantage was being sought.

The Council also revises its previous view (based on McLaren’s description of his role within the team) that Coughlan would not have been in a position to influence the design and development of the MP4-22 car.

“The submissions made for the 13 September WMSC meeting show that Coughlan may have had a more active role in the design of the McLaren car than previously appreciated by the WMSC,” it says.

The original WMSC ruling in July stated that McLaren had breached Article 151c of the International Sporting Code but levied no penalty because of “insufficient evidence” that the team used or benefited from a 780-page Ferrari dossier possessed by Coughlan.

The WMSC appears to acknowledge that there is still no conclusive proof that McLaren copied Ferrari designs or used any confidential data to its advantage.

Instead, it explains its radically different verdict by saying it now believes McLaren committed a much more serious breach of Article 151c.

“The WMSC…finds that a number of McLaren employees or agents were in unauthorised possession of, or knew or should have known that other McLaren employees were in unauthorised possession of, highly confidential Ferrari technical information,” it concludes.

“In addition, the WMSC finds that there was an intention on the part of a number of McLaren personnel to use some of the Ferrari confidential information in its own testing.

“The evidence leads the WMSC to conclude that some degree of sporting advantage was obtained, though it may forever be impossible to quantify that advantage in concrete terms.

“These factors lead the WMSC to an appreciation of the gravity of McLaren’s breach which is materially different to the appreciation in the 26 July decision.

“On this occasion the WMSC believes that a penalty is merited.”

McLaren argued in its defence that a penalty would not be justified unless it could be demonstrated, to a criminal law standard of proof, that it had used and benefited from the Ferrari material.

But the WMSC rejects this claim, insisting that “neither the finding of a breach nor the imposition of a penalty require evidence of McLaren having directed incorporated Ferrari technology”.

“The fact that in its 26 July decision, based on more limited evidence, the Council had a different appreciation of the gravity of McLaren’s breach does not lead to the creation of a legal test regarding the WMSC’s burden of proof,” it says.